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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-4412 
___________ 
 
JENN-CHING LUO, 
         Appellant  
 
 v. 
 
 OWEN J. ROBERTS SCHOOL DISTRICT;  
 GEOFFREY BALL; BRIAN SCHNEIDER;  
 SHARON W. MONTANYE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-15-cv-04248) 
District Judge: Honorable Thomas N. O’Neill, Jr. 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 8, 2018 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, KRAUSE and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 11, 2018) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant, Jenn-Ching Luo, appeals from the District Court’s order entered 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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October 31, 2016.  For the following reasons, we will affirm.   
I. 
 Luo is the father of B.L., a minor who receives special education services in the 
Owen J. Roberts School District in Pottstown, Pennsylvania.  B.L. was originally placed 
in a day program within the district, but Luo later asked that B.L. be moved to a 
residential program.  B.L.’s Individualized Education Plan (IEP) team agreed to a 
residential placement.  After meetings with Special Education Supervisor Geoffrey Ball, 
however, Luo received a revised IEP indicating that B.L. was ineligible for such 
placement.  The revised IEP also included a Specially Designed Instruction (SDI) 
directing Luo to take a parent-training course under the School District’s supervision.  
The School District also issued a Notice of Recommended Educational Placement 
(NOREP) notifying Luo of its intent to implement the proposed SDI requiring parent 
training.     
Luo objected and filed an administrative due process complaint under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400−1482.  
Following a hearing in August 2014, Hearing Officer Cathy A. Skidmore ordered an 
Independent Educational Evaluation (IEE) in order to determine B.L.’s needs.  Luo 
objected and informed the School District that he intended to appeal the Hearing 
Officer’s decision.    
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Accordingly, in November 2014, Luo commenced an action in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  (E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 14-cv-6354) 
(Luo I).  Luo named as defendants: the School District; Sharon Montayne, the School 
District’s attorney; Supervisor Ball; Hearing Officer Skidmore; and Keri Kolbay, a 
psychologist hired to conduct the IEE.1   
Meanwhile, the School District proceeded to conduct the IEE.  At a meeting in 
January 2015, the IEP team proposed revisions to B.L.’s IEP based on Kolbay’s 
recommendations.  Among other revisions, the IEP recommended that a behavioral 
specialist observe B.L. at school and at home.  To this end, and with Luo’s consent, the 
School District’s psychologist, Brian Schneider, evaluated B.L.  Dr. Schneider concluded 
that B.L. was more independent at school than at home, and recommended that Luo 
undergo parent training.  Around this time, the School District issued another NOREP 
notifying Luo of its intent to implement the proposed SDIs requiring parent training.    
Luo filed a number of additional administrative complaints challenging the School 
District’s actions and recommendations.  A hearing on the consolidated complaints took 
                                              
1 The complaint set forth the following claims: the School District and Ball had violated 
Luo’s “liberty right” by recommending the SDI (claims one and two) and failing to 
obtain a residential placement for B.L. (claim three); Skidmore violated his liberty right 
to informed consent and due process by ordering the IEE (claim four); the School 
District, Ball, and Kolbay violated his rights to privacy and due process by transmitting 
and reviewing B.L.’s records (claims three and seven); the School District, Ball, Kolbay, 
and Montayne violated his due process rights by proceeding with the IEE after he 
appealed the Hearing Officer’s decision (claims six and eight). 
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place on February 13, 2015.  This time, the hearing officer found in Luo’s favor in 
several respects.   
The School District then initiated its own case against Luo in the District Court 
seeking reversal of the hearing officer’s decision.  (E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 15-cv-2952) (Luo 
II).  Luo responded with counterclaims against the School District challenging the need 
for the IEE and raising claims for both breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, and malicious abuse of process.  Luo also filed a third-party complaint raising 
due process and malicious-abuse-of-process claims against the attorneys who represented 
the School District at the administrative level and law firm Sweet Stevens Katz & 
Williams LLP.  Following additional administrative hearings, Luo commenced another 
civil action in the District Court against the School District, Ball, Montayne, and 
Schneider.  (E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 15-cv-4248) (Luo III).2   
                                              
2 Luo raised the following claims in the complaint: violation of his equal protection rights 
by the School District and Ball (claim one);  violation of Luo’s liberty rights by the 
School District and Ball (claims two, five, and six); malicious abuse of process by the 
School District, Ball, and Montayne (claim three); violation of Luo’s substantive due 
process rights by the School District and Ball (claim four); breach of the duty of good 
faith and fair dealing by the School District and Ball (claim seven); defamation by the 
School District and Ball (claim eight); harassment by the School District and Ball (claim 
nine); violation of Luo’s liberty right by the School District and Schneider (claim ten); 
violation of Luo’s substantive due process rights by the School District and Schneider 
(claim eleven); defamation against the School District and Schneider (claim twelve); and 
negligence against the School District and Schneider (claim thirteen). 
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The various parties moved to dismiss the complaints in Luo I, Luo II, and Luo III.  
These motions were referred to a Magistrate Judge who issued a Report and 
Recommendation in each case.  The parties filed objections.  On October 27, 2016, the 
District Court issued a Memorandum Opinion addressing the Reports and 
Recommendations as well as the parties’ objections in all three cases.  The District Court 
determined that several of Luo’s claims survived the motions to dismiss, but noted that 
the state of the three actions—which included overlapping facts and claims—made 
practical resolution of the issues difficult.  Therefore, having reviewed the parties’ claims 
under Rule 12(b)(6), “and with an eye toward efficiency,” the District Court ordered as 
follows.  
In Luo I, the District Court dismissed with prejudice all of Luo’s Fifth-
Amendment claims, all claims against Hearing Officer Skidmore, and all claims against 
Attorney Montayne.  However, the court dismissed without prejudice Luo’s claims 
against the School District and Ball (claims one through three, and claims five through 
eight), and instructed him to re-plead these claims in a seconded amended complaint.  
The District Court likewise dismissed Luo’s claims against Kolbay (claims five and six) 
without prejudice to his ability to re-plead them.  In Luo II, the court did not dismiss any 
of the School District’s claims, but dismissed with prejudice Luo’s counterclaims and the 
claims raised in his third-party complaint. 
In Luo III, the District Court dismissed with prejudice claims one, three, and seven 
through thirteen.  The court determined that the remaining claims (claims two, four, five, 
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and six), however, could go forward.  That being said, the court concluded that these four 
claims were substantially identical to claims that Luo had raised in Luo I.  Therefore, the 
District Court dismissed claims two, four, five, and six in Luo III without prejudice to 
Luo’s ability to include them in his second amended complaint in Luo I.     
The District Court then consolidated Luo I and Luo II pursuant to Rule 42(a) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, closed Luo III, and directed Luo to file a second 
amended complaint in Luo I setting forth all claims not dismissed with prejudice within 
thirty days (by November 30, 2016).  The court instructed Luo to take care to combine 
like claims and include all factual allegations relating to a particular claim within that 
claim.   
 Instead of filing a second amended consolidated complaint as instructed, Luo filed 
a motion for reconsideration challenging the District Court’s order.  The District Court 
denied reconsideration and directed Luo to file the second amended consolidated 
complaint by December 23, 2016.  The District Court advised Luo that failure to do so 
would result in the dismissal with prejudice of all remaining claims.  Luo did not amend 
his pleading within that time period.  Instead, on December 26, 2016, Luo filed a notice 
of appeal seeking review of the District Court’s orders.  The District Court has stayed the 
proceedings below pending resolution of this appeal.    
II. 
 Although we ordinarily lack jurisdiction over an order that dismisses a complaint 
without prejudice in part, we may exercise jurisdiction here because Luo has elected to 
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stand on his complaint.3  See Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 n.5 (3d 
Cir. 1992).  In addition, the Supreme Court has recently held that when, as in this case, 
“one of several consolidated cases is finally decided, a disappointed litigant is free to 
seek review of that decision in the court of appeals” even if one of the other consolidated 
cases remains pending.  Hall v. Hall, 138 S. Ct. 1118, 1131 (2018).  Therefore, we will 
treat the District Court’s order as final and exercise appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  See Wellman v. Butler Area Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 125, 130 (3d Cir. 2017).  Our 
review is plenary.  Our review of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is plenary.  See Scattergood 
v. Perelman, 945 F.2d 618, 621 (3d Cir.1991).    
III. 
A. The District Court’s Dismissal Without Prejudice of Claims Two, Four, 
Five, and Six in Luo III 
 
 Luo’s primary argument on appeal is that the District Court erred in dismissing 
without prejudice claims two, four, five, and six in Luo III and instructing him to re-plead 
them in a second amended complaint in Luo I.  According to Luo, the District Court erred 
because the claims in Luo III were not substantially similar to any claims in Luo I.   
                                              
3 Because Luo filed his motion for reconsideration within twenty-eight days of the 
District Court’s October 31, 2016 order, we have jurisdiction to review both the District 
Court’s order denying reconsideration and its underlying order.  See CTC Imp. & Exp. v. 
Nigerian Petroleum Corp., 951 F.2d 573, 577 (3d Cir. 1991).  Luo does not specifically 
challenge the District Court’s order denying reconsideration.   
 
8 
 
 The District Court acted within its discretion in administering its docket in this 
manner.4  We have made clear that a plaintiff has “no right to maintain two separate 
actions involving the same subject matter at the same time in the same court and against 
the same defendant.”  Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1977).  Thus, a 
district court faced with a second, duplicative complaint may choose to dismiss the 
second complaint without prejudice.  Id.  We have reviewed the pleadings and agree with 
the District Court that the disputed claims were substantially similar.  Furthermore, even 
assuming that the complaint in Luo III contained some distinct allegations, we fail to see 
how Luo was prejudiced by the District Court’s action given that he was permitted to re-
plead each of these claims in a new complaint in Luo I.  The District Court’s effective 
consolidation of the two complaints was purely for administrative efficiency and had no 
effect on Luo’s ability to proceed with these causes of action.5  Luo could have so 
proceeded by filing a second amended complaint in Luo I but chose not to do so.   
 B. The District Court’s Dismissal of the Malicious-Abuse-of-Process Claim 
                                              
4 We review a district court’s dismissal of a duplicative complaint for abuse of discretion.  
Adam v. Jacobs, 950 F.2d 89, 92 (2d Cir.1991).  
 
5 To the extent that Luo argues that claims raised in a second amended complaint in Luo I 
would have been time-barred, the District Court specifically addressed this concern, 
explaining that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(B) allows relation back of any 
amendments that “assert[] a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction or 
occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original pleading.”  As a common 
core of operative facts existed between Luo I and Luo III, Luo’s new claims would have 
been timely. 
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 Luo next challenges the District Court’s determination that he failed to state a 
claim for malicious abuse of process.  In claim three in Luo III, Luo asserted that Ball’s 
use of NOREPS to force him into parent training constituted malicious abuse of process.  
Luo sought to hold Ball, the School District, and Attorney Montayne liable under this 
theory.   
“[A] section 1983 claim for malicious abuse of process lies where prosecution is 
initiated legitimately and thereafter is used for a purpose other than that intended by the 
law.”  Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 350 n.17 (3d Cir. 1989) (quotation marks omitted).   
“The gravamen of [a malicious abuse of process claim] is not the wrongful procurement 
of legal process or the wrongful initiation of criminal or civil proceedings; it is the misuse 
of process, no matter how properly obtained, for any purpose other than that which it was 
designed to accomplish.”  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 682 cmt. a (1977).  
The District Court correctly concluded that Luo failed to state a claim for 
malicious abuse of process.  Simply stated, the agency’s issuance of NOREPS does not 
constitute “process” for purposes of a § 1983 malicious-abuse-of-process claim.  A 
NOREP is a form completed at the end of the IEP development process that must be 
provided to parents whenever the school district proposes a change.  20 U.S.C. § 
1415(b)(3), (c)(1).  A NOREP is not a form of legal process.  Luo fails to cite any 
authority to support his contention that a malicious-abuse-of-process claim may rest on a 
school district’s issuance of NOREPs or similar administrative action.   
 C. The District Court’s Dismissal of the Informed-Consent Claim  
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 In claim ten of Luo III, Luo asserted that he was deprived of his liberty right “to 
informed consent” regarding the adaptive behavior assessment that Dr. Schneider 
performed on B.L.  Luo conceded that he generally consented to Dr. Schneider’s 
assessment, but claimed that he did not consent to the methodology that Dr. Schneider 
used to conclude that B.L. was more independent at school than at home.  Borrowing the 
concept of informed consent from the medical context, Luo contended that Dr. 
Schneider’s “unapproved assessment” amounted to a violation of “the liberty right to 
informed consent.”   
We agree with the District Court that Luo does not have a constitutionally 
protected interest in being advised of the methodology Dr. Schneider used in the adaptive 
behavior assessment.  Rights are protected under the Due Process Clause if they are “so 
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental” or if 
such rights reflect basic values “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” such that 
“neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”  Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).  As the District 
Court explained, Luo’s interest in being advised of Dr. Schneider’s methodology is not 
the sort of “fundamental” interest entitled to the protection of substantive due process.  
As a result, the District Court correctly concluded that Luo failed to assert a substantive 
due process claim in this regard.  
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IV. 
 We have reviewed Luo’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are 
meritless.  Accordingly, we will affirm. 
